Questions about jewish migrations from Morocco: "Operation mural"  (summer 1961) : return from diaspora or formation of a new diaspora ? by Abécassis, Frédéric
QUESTIONS ABOUT JEWISH MIGRATIONS FROM
MOROCCO
Fre´de´ric Abe´cassis
To cite this version:
Fre´de´ric Abe´cassis. QUESTIONS ABOUT JEWISH MIGRATIONS FROM MOROCCO: ”OP-
ERATION MURAL” (SUMMER 1961): RETURN FROM DIASPORA OR FORMATION OF
A NEW DIASPORA?. QUESTIONS ABOUT JEWISH MIGRATIONS FROM MOROCCO,
Jun 2012, Je´rusalem, Israel. pp.73-82, 2013. <halshs-00778664>
HAL Id: halshs-00778664
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00778664
Submitted on 21 Jan 2014
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
73 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PROF. FRÉDÉRIC ABÉCASSIS 
UNIVERSITÉ DE LYON, ECOLE NORMALE SUPÉRIEURE 
 
 
 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit der Sozial- und Geisteswissenschaften in 
Wissenschaft und Forschung – “Union für das Mittelmeer” 
New – Hybrid Diasporas 
Diasporas im Zeitalter der Globalisierung 
Inter-/Transidentität – Inter-/Transnation 
 
 
 
 
Teilprojekt: QUESTIONS ABOUT JEWISH MIGRATIONS FROM MOROCCO 
"OPERATION MURAL" (SUMMER 1961): RETURN FROM DIASPORA OR 
FORMATION OF A NEW DIASPORA? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
74 
 
 
 
 
 
Contents 
1. Project description  
            1.1 Object of project research    
 1.2 Research goal, methodology and theoretical approach  
 
2.  Bibliography  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
75 
 
 
PROF. FRÉDÉRIC ABÉCASSIS 
UNIVERSITÉ DE LYON, ECOLE NORMALE SUPÉRIEURE 
 
 
QUESTIONS ABOUT JEWISH MIGRATIONS FROM MOROCCO 
"OPERATION MURAL" (SUMMER 1961): RETURN FROM DIASPORA OR 
FORMATION OF A NEW DIASPORA? 
 
1. PROJECT DESCRIPTION 
 
This project is at its very beginning. It deals with the illegal emigration to Israel of 
530 Moroccan Jewish children during the summer of 1961. It is mainly a project about 
social history, but in a political context which needs to be precised. Moreover, it raises 
the question of the interactions between politics and society, and the pretension of politics 
to shape society. Taking these 530 children as a sample, it is my intention to study the 
sociology of their families and to reconstruct their migratory path all their life. 
David Littman, one of the organizers of what he, like many others, considers as a 
rescue operation, recently provided testimony on the conduct of this operation, which 
code name for the Mossad was "Opération Mural". Most of the information about this 
operation comes from Littmann himself. The story of Operation Mural was first 
recounted by Shmuel Segev in a full-page 1984 article in Maariv and in a chapter of his 
book, Operation Yakhin, which has been added to the book after Littman gave his 1962’s 
report to Shmuel Segev in 1983. This led to a public recognition by President Chaim 
Herzog at an official presidential reception, followed in 1986 by the Mimouna award 
which Gisèle and David Littman received in Jerusalem from the then Prime Minister 
Shimon Peres. 
In 2006, David Littman went back to Morocco with two Mossad agents, 
pretending to be ordinary retired persons, and they made a film in Casablanca on the very 
site where their action had taken place. The film was completed and shown on the Israeli 
First channel in 2007. On June 1st, 2008, a special commemorative ceremony was held in 
President Shimon Peres’s Jerusalem residence and one year later, David Littman recieved 
from the Israel Intelligence and Commemoration Center the citation to the ‘Hero of 
Silence’ Order. David Littman died in May 2012, but his daughter will soon publish the 
book she was helping him to write before his death, telling his version of the operation in 
which he and his wife were involved. His wife is a famous historian, known as Bat-
Ye’Or (Daughter of the Nile in Hebrew), and she is interested in helping me in this 
project, giving her own testimony, showing me some archives and providing me with the 
contacts that I need. 
 
David Littman was not himself a member of the Mossad. In 1961, he was 28 years 
old, came from a wealthy Jewish family and was a graduate of prestigious Anglican 
schools. About a year earlier he had married Giselle Orebi, the daughter of an Egyptian 
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jewish family that had immigrated from Egypt to Britain after the Suez crisis. He did not 
even know that he was working for the Mossad: 
 
In November 1960, as a British citizen, I was newly established with my 
wife in Lausanne, Switzerland, where I began reading William Shirer’s Rise and 
Fall of the Third Reich. It led me to ask the following questions: “What could a 
Jew, living in a neutral country like Sweden or Switzerland during World War II, 
have done to help Jews?” “What can I do for Jews in distress right now?” 
I knew of the plight of Jews in Arab lands after the birth of Israel, when 
hundreds of thousands were forced—or felt obliged—to leave their native 
countries. Like 25,000 others, my wife, Gisèle, had fled Egypt a year after the Suez 
War in the wake of the Free Officers’ Revolt. 
I volunteered my services to all international Jewish organizations in 
Geneva, but there was no enthusiasm until I reached my last door. There, Professor 
Jacques Bloch, the director of an organization for Jewish children (OSE), had 
received a visit two days earlier from the Jewish Agency’s representative, Naftali 
Bargiora, who was looking for a volunteer to arrange Swiss holidays for Jewish 
children from Morocco—and from there to Israel. After meeting Bargiora, I 
quickly accepted this fascinating mission, to be called Operation Mural (after my 
code name, “Mural”). (Littman, 2011:575) 
  
Littman’s mission took place at a crucial moment. 1961 was a pivotal year in the 
history of the migration of the Jews from Morocco. From 1948 to the independence of 
Morocco, during all of the years in which the Jewish Agency’s Qadima organization 
functioned in Morocco, approximately  110,000  Jews had left  the  country (Bin-Nun, 
2010). Since 1956, soon after Morocco’s Independence, the gates for emigration were 
closed: Zionist activity was forbidden, and it became more difficult for a Jew to get a 
passport to travel abroad.  There was a consensus among the Moroccan authorities 
against the departure of the Jews, whether by refusal to strengthen the Israeli population, 
by fear of weakening the Moroccan economy or in a will to build a liberal and modern 
country with equal rights for all citizens. Between 1957 and November of 1961, when the 
government began to permit Jews to  leave  under  collective  passports, slightly less than 
30,000 people had left  Morocco, and about a third of them through various paths of 
illegal emigration organized by the Israeli security services. The community itself was 
divided. The departure of the French officials had represented for many of them a 
favorable environment and opportunities for promotion, especially in the administration. 
But in October 1960, receiving a delegation from the American Jewish Joint Distribution 
Committee, the Secretary of the Council of Jewish Communities, David Amar, drew a 
pessimistic picture of the community. According to him, nearly 80% of the 240,000 
members of the community wanted to emigrate; 60% wanted to leave immediately, and 
needed help to realize their project. The remaining 20% still hoped to stay there, but did 
not exclude the possibility of a departure (Yigal Bin Nun, 2009) 
In 1961 the chain of events seemed to precipitate the choice for Moroccan Jews: 
on January 3rd, Gamal Abdel Nasser came to Morocco to attend the Arab League 
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conference in Casablanca. His visit sparked a wave of incidents which increased the 
anxiety of the community. On January 11, the boat Pisces (Egoz) charged with emigrants 
sank with 45 people on board. This shipwreck highlighted the dangers of illegal 
emigration and led to a wave of international protests. A month later, on the occasion of 
the memorial of their disappearance, leaflets were distributed against the authorities, 
which led to several arrests and the collapse of  the Israeli clandestine network in 
Morocco, the Misgeret. On February 26th, King Mohammed V died just days after 
receiving the community leaders to listen to their concerns and reassure them. His son 
Moulay Hassan was crowned king in his place. 
Since 1960, indirect talks had been initiated between the Israeli authorities and the 
heir to the throne, and even with the leftist leader, Mehdi Ben Barka (Bin-Nun, 2008). 
According to Yigal Bin Nun (2009), the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
progressively convinced to consider financial compensation to the departure of the Jews, 
as it had been done in Iraq and Romania. In early May 1961, Isser Harel, the Director of 
the Mossad, decided to entrust to Alex Gatmon, chief of the Misgeret in Morocco, the 
mission to contact Jewish intermediaries to start negotiations with the Moroccan 
authorities. By the end of July, with the collaboration of Sam Benazeraf and Dr Isaac 
Cohen Olivar, he was negociating with Abdelkader Benjelloun (Minister of Labour) and 
Moulay Ali Alaoui (the King’s cousin and brother-in-law) and came to a compromise 
agreement. An economic clause was planned: half a million dollars would be paid as a 
down payment for the emigration of 50,000 Moroccan Jews to Europe, and then, 100$ 
per capita (250$ after the 50,000th). A humanitarian association, The Hebrew Immigrant 
Aid Society (HIAS) would be the façade for the Israeli emissaries. The Moroccan 
authorities demanded that the Jews leave Morocco as entire families and not as single and 
selected migrants, as was the case since 1953. Furthermore, Alex Gatmon refused to 
dissolve his network “Misgeret” in Morocco, and clandestine emigration kept on until the 
end of the negotiations. Raphaël Spanien, the HIAS representative in Morocco, 
negociated with colonel Oufkir collective passports issue by the Ministry of Interior. By 
the end of November 1961, Operation Yakhin had began. From then till 1964, 97,005 
Jews left Morocco with the tacit agreement of the Moroccan authorities. 
 
Operation Mural took place during the negociation of Operation Yakhin. Let's go 
back to Littman's narrative: 
Contacts by the Mossad with the new king’s representatives  were  only  
beginning  when I reached  Casablanca  on  March 16, 1961, as a delegate of an 
international children’s organization, OSE, renamed OSSEAN [Oeuvre Suisse de 
Secours aux Enfants de l’Afrique du Nord]. [...]  I arrived in Casablanca on March 
16 and Gisèle on the 31, and in early May I brought out our five-month-old  
daughter, Diana. Our  family  “cover”  as  a  normal  Christian  family was  now  
complete,  with  me  as  OSSEAN’s  emissary.  We  stayed  at  the Anfa, the city’s 
prime hotel, and I soon developed contacts with key people in administrative 
circles, among them a senior official in Morocco’s security services. Concurrently, 
I had clandestine meetings with my “contacts,” Gad Shahar and Pinhas Katzir, and, 
on the last evening of Operation Mural, July 23, 1961, with the head of the Mossad 
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in Morocco, Alex Gatmon.  I also  worked with  members of the misgueret,  young  
Jews recruited to help their community to immigrate to Israel. 
Our  goal  was  clear:  to  obtain  government  authorization  for  any 
Moroccan  children  to  attend  summer  camps  in  Switzerland.  With  the 
assistance of the misgueret, I began drawing up lists for collective group passports 
as the Moroccan authorities preferred, rather than for individual child  passports  
(as  preferred  by  the  Jewish  Agency).  The  authorities agreed to prepare a list of 
Muslim children from families of the Martyrs of the Moroccan independence. 
Between June 26 and July 24, 1961, 530 Jewish  children,  some  as  young  as  
seven,  left  for  Switzerland  in  five convoys and later reached Israel. 
Operation Mural was soon followed by Operation Yakhin, in which nearly  
100,000—entire  families,  the  young  and  the  old—reached  Israel between  
1962 and  1964, using  the  same agreed system of “collective passports,” this time 
with the king’s approval, after negotiations with the Mossad.” (Littman, 2011:577-
578) 
 
1.1      Object of project research 
A great deal of mystery still surrounds Operation Mural,  and  not only because it 
was a matter of secret services. Of course, one of my first tasks will be to  reconstruct the 
scenario of the operation, to collect and examine the archives and the different 
testimonies and accounts of its various actors - if  such documents exist or if  these 
actors are still alive - in order to understand the exact role played  by each one,  and  what 
he knew or  ignored about the operation in which he or she was involved. Furthermore, 
the simultaneity between negotiations with the Moroccan authorities  on the one 
hand,  and the progress of operation Mural  on the other hand, which seemed  to have 
been conducted under the authority of a single person, Alex Gatmon, raises further 
questions about the connections between them. And from that point of view, 
the  reconstruction of the actors' strategies may be more difficult. 
As Yigal Bin Nun asserted, the pursuit of illegal immigration during the 
negotiations was, for the Mossad, a sign of defiance towards the Moroccan authorities. 
Could it have been a way to exert pressure on them?  could it have been a way to prove 
the determination of  the  families, ready to send their own children with the risk of not 
seeing them again for a long time?  or was it, if the negotiations failed, to make the 
Moroccan authorities responsible for the prolonged separation of families 
once  the  children were abroad?  The  Moroccan authorities could have feared an 
international campaign on the subject of the freedom of movement  such as the one which 
was  launched after the sinking of the Pisces. 
 Moreover, the Moroccan authorities were perhaps more aware of what was going 
on   than Littman thought, and it would be interesting to try to reconstruct  what was 
known or suspected, and at which level. In the film, Litman admits  that there was a 
moment when he was very afraid when Si Aloui Tajeddine, khalife of Casablanca’s first 
district (including the Mellah),  on seeing the names of the children,  recognized Jewish 
names, and suspected some kind of conspiration. Littman attributes to  a  personal 
relationship  that  he had established with Muhammad D’Khissy, an 
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official  at Casablanca’s prefecture, the fact of having been protected, but it is not 
impossible that the order came from above: Muhammad D’Khissy was in fact a senior 
official in  the  internal security  apparatus. Could this operation have been a way, both 
for the Mossad and  for the Moroccan authorities (but on separate  tracks), to check the 
reactions of Moroccan civil servants (from the Ministry of Interior to the  border 
police)  to what  looked like a semi-clandestine emigration ?  Was it a way of testing 
procedures such as collective passports which would then be established  for  Operation 
Yakhin ? That’s what Littman suggests in his last paragraph. 
 
But the most important  issue is to try to understand what  the  families knew 
about this operation, what they had been told and what they believed. Were the parents 
aware that they were sending their children for a long-term emigration to Israel,  and not 
to a summer camp in Switzerland? It is highly probable, because they received the 
registration fees from the Misgeret the day before they had to pay for them. But for 
security reasons,  complete silence was required  concerning the real destination of 
children. As for  the children themselves, it is quite  certain that they did not know 
very  much about their real destination, nor the fact that their journey was supposed to be 
permanent. Some of them  might be questioned by  the police - as it happened indeed -
  and they  were not even to think of the word Israel, in order not to pronounce it. And 
this point is perhaps the most important blind spot of this history, because we have to 
imagine the fears behind this deep silence and at the same time the confidence it implied 
towards the institutions which organized the migration and were in charge of it.  
In that sense, Operation Mural could have been a means of legitimizing Operation 
Yakhin before the Jewish public opinion, or at least before the leaders of the community, 
who were still divided. The project of a collective migration to Israel became necessary 
because Operation Mural proved that some Jewish families from Morocco were unsecure 
to the point that they saw no future but outside the country, and that they were ready to 
defy the Moroccan authorities by leaving it secretly, assuming the risks of clandestinity 
for their children and for themselves. What was the real cause of these fears? The 
sociological survey might reveal the existence of a feeling of a changing attitude towards 
the Jews in Morocco and anxiety about the future in that country, the repercussions of the 
extermination of the European Jewry could have made the Moroccan families realize that 
the worst was possible; it might also reveal the role of young European and Zionist 
agents in the diffusion of those fears. It could also point out the desire to escape from the 
common misery, which was true of many Moroccans at that moment, especially in the 
countryside and in the Atlas. Operation Mural would give the children an opportunity to a 
better life than their parents ; operation Yakhin would allow them to join a migratory path 
at a moment of great economic transformations in Morocco, and of mistrust of the ability 
of the regime to face them. The confidence in the organizers of Operation Mural also had 
a political meaning, which perhaps the families didn’t realize at the moment, but proved 
later to be a transfer of allegiance. 
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1.2     Research goal, methodology and theoretical approach 
This research would be a way of getting out of the debate on the push-pull factors 
in migrations, and of putting the migration projects of the families at the center of the 
analysis. It would also be a way to take their strategies and their migratory histories 
(before and during the 50 years following Operation Mural) as a starting point, and to 
analyze the Jewish migrations from Morocco as a social fact and not from an ideological 
point of view. As one of the organizers of a big conference in Essaouira in 2010 on the 
Jewish and Muslim migrations in the Maghreb, (Abécassis, Dirèche, Aouad, 2012), I was 
able to realize that this history was an extremely sensitive one, still dividing historians 
and witnesses of that period between those who considered these migrations as an 
opportunity to realize the old dream of coming back from diaspora to Eretz Israel, and 
those who regarded them as an uprooting, the latter group looking for responsibilities 
either in the way of the Arab nationalism, or of Zionist activism. This history is too often 
written from an external and overlooking point of view, neglecting the actors and trying 
to legitimate or otherwise to denigrate the actions of the politicians. 
It is my intention to take into account the social variables of this sample, such as 
residence, social background, education level, gender, in order to understand who were 
these children and their families. Mrs Littman - Bat Yeor - told me that they had kept 
lists and addresses of all of them, which could be the starting point of this inquiry - 
Geneva is not so far away from Lyons. But this survey will also have to ask questions 
about what has become of these children. David Littman tells that “[In 1986], a meeting 
was arranged in Tel Aviv for us to meet 120 of “our” children. It was an incredibly 
moving experience” (Littman, 2011:575). This means that at least a quarter of the sample 
stayed in Israel. Would it be possible to pick up the trail of the rest of the children and to 
reconstruct their trajectories? Where did they settle in Israel? Was Israel a final 
destination or a step in a world-wide migration ?  The survey will have to combine a 
statistical approach with life narratives, focusing on the migration projects, the 
conditions of the departure, how the families were able to regroup in Israel, on the sense 
of belonging and construction of identities.  
In linking up the political and the social levels, this work could be the extension of 
the reflection engaged in my previous works on the community building process in 
contemporary Egypt and the emergence of nation-states in the Middle East. It also raises 
issues that are central to any Diaspora: the exercise of the monopoly of legitimate 
violence, the ways of building communities, national groups and their norms, the break 
in transmission induced by modernity and resilience. 
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